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The way in which mixture risk assessment (MRA) should be included in chemical risk assessment is a
current topic of debate. We used data from 67 recent pesticide evaluations to build a case study using
Hazard Index calculations to form risk estimates in a tiered MRA approach in line with a Framework
proposed by WHO/IPCS. The case study is used to illustrate the approach and to add detail to the existing
Framework, and includes many more chemicals than previous case studies.
A low-tier MRA identiﬁed risk as being greater than acceptable, but reﬁning risk estimates in higher
tiers was not possible due to data requirements not being readily met. Our analysis identiﬁes data re-
quirements, which typically expand dramatically in higher tiers, as being the likely cause for an MRA to
fail in many realistic cases. This forms a major obstacle to routine implementation of MRA and shows the
need for systematic generation and collection of toxicological data. In low tiers, hazard quotient in-
spection identiﬁes chemicals that contribute most to the HI value and thus require attention if further
reﬁnement is needed. Implementing MRA requires consensus on issues such as scope setting, criteria for
performing reﬁnement, and decision criteria for actions.
© 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Mixture risk assessment (MRA) is the assessment of the cu-
mulative risk to human health or the environment from multiple
chemicals via multiple routes. Currently, chemicals are routinely
assessed on a chemical-by-chemical basis, with the notable
exception of the approach to dioxin-like chemicals, whereinceptable level; CAG, cumula-
agricultural practice; GEMS,
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.M. Evans), martin.scholze@
el.ac.uk (A. Kortenkamp).selected PCBs, dioxins and furans are assessed collectively by
application of a toxic equivalency quotient/factor (TEQ/TEF)
approach (van den Berg et al., 1998). There is concern that the
chemical-by-chemical approach may not be sufﬁciently protective
if two or more chemicals have the same toxic effect (Boobis et al.,
2008; Kortenkamp et al., 2009). It is incontrovertible that humans
are exposed tomore than one chemical at a time, for example to the
multiple chemicals found in food, in air and drinking water, and in
household and consumer products and cosmetics. Mixture toxi-
cology is the branch of toxicology that deals with predicting and
managing the exposure of humans or the environment to multiple
chemicals and their associated toxicological effects. The existence
of a mixture per se does not always indicate a risk to human or
environmental health, but indicates the need to examine whether
more accurate estimations of risk will be produced by considering
all of the chemicals that are present.
Whilst there is a broad consensus on the basic science of
mixture toxicology (Kortenkamp et al., 2009; DG Health and
Consumer Protection, 2011), the path to regulatory implementa-
tion of these considerations, as an MRA, in chemical risk assess-
ment is less clear. Options were outlined in an EFSA opinion (EFSA,
R.M. Evans et al. / Food and Chemical Toxicology 84 (2015) 260e269 2612008) and, currently, proposals for MRA approaches include a
Framework developed by WHO/IPCS for “Risk assessment of com-
bined exposure to multiple chemicals” (Meek et al., 2011), a deci-
sion tree of the European Commission Scientiﬁc Committees (DG
Health and Consumer Protection, 2011) and an approach exam-
ining the contribution of individual mixture components to the
joint effect, termed maximum cumulative ratio (Price et al., 2014).
Of these, the WHO/IPCS Framework is the most widely used. It has
the stated aim of aiding “risk assessors in identifying priorities for
risk management for a wide range of applications where co-
exposures to multiple chemicals are expected.” The Framework is
described as hierarchical, phased and tiered with “integrated and
iterative consideration of exposure and hazard at all phases, with
each tier being more reﬁned”. A ‘more reﬁned’ tier is described as
being less cautious, more certain, more labour intensive and more
data intensive than the preceding tier. The underlying philosophy is
to invest more resources in the analysis only if assessments based
on less data intensive assumptions indicate that levels deemed to
be acceptable are exceeded. The tiers detailed in the WHO/IPCS
Framework are not ﬁxed; their use will depend on data availability,
and tiers can be added or removed as necessary. Use of either
predictive or probabilistic methodologies is placed in various tiers
and uncertainty is considered at each tier.
Two areas in which the WHO/IPCS Framework does not provide
much detail are 1) criteria for ceasing reﬁnement and applying risk
management measures, and 2) criteria for the grouping of chem-
icals within anMRA. A decision about ceasing reﬁnement is needed
at the end of each tier when the risk has not been shown to be
acceptable. It is not clear whether the implementation of risk
management that would be mandated if the highest tier was
exceeded should also be mandated in low tiers when progression is
not achievable due to data gaps or difﬁculties with data availability.
Grouping of chemicals for MRA is proposed in the second tier of the
WHO/IPCS Framework but no details are provided on what the
need or prerequisites for grouping are. Outstanding questions
include, for example, would grouping on the basis of chemical
structure be acceptable? Should the grouping approach have
particular demands in terms of retaining conservatism or would
the Framework allow this property to be lost? EFSA has begun the
process of identifying cumulative assessment groups (CAGs),
commencing with the deﬁnition of CAGs covering phenomeno-
logical effects of pesticides on thyroid and nervous system (EFSA,
2013), although the full set of CAGs may need to be available
before they can meaningfully be introduced into MRA. We have
explored options in both these areas within this case study.
The guiding approach that is used in most MRA approaches is
the Hazard Index (HI), in which ﬁrstly, hazard quotients (HQs) are
calculated for each chemical in the exposure scenario by dividing
their exposure level by an ‘acceptable’ level, such as an acceptable
daily intake (ADI) or reference dose (RfD); secondly, the HQs are
summed to give the HI (Teuschler and Hertzberg, 1995). Conven-
tionally, a HI of greater than one indicates that the total exposure
exceeds the level considered to be ‘acceptable’, where the deﬁni-
tion of acceptable depends on the denominators used in the HQ
calculation. The Margin of Exposure (MoE) approach is conceptu-
ally similar to the HI, but usually operates with ‘points of departure’
(PoD) values such as benchmark doses or no-observed adverse
effect levels (NOAELs) to which safety or uncertainty factors have
not been applied. Whereas the critical value for an HI is greater than
or equal to 1, the critical value for anMoE is less than or equal to one
hundred.
Two prior case studies have presented examples of MRA for
triazole pesticides and for polybrominated diphenyl ethers (PBDEs)
(EFSA, 2009; Meek et al., 2011). The triazole case study used the
hazard index (HI) approach to explore a tiered strategy in detail, butartiﬁcially restricted their analysis to seven or eleven pesticides for
endpoints of cranio-facial malformation and hepatotoxicity,
respectively, for reasons of data availability (EFSA, 2009). The study
calculated low tier HI values that were mostly below one: 0.1 (total
Dutch population) and 0.24 (children sub-population). However,
when HI values were calculated for individual food commodities, as
part of an evaluation of the use of HI in maximum residue level
(MRL) setting, exposure to bitertanol via apples had a HI of 1.19,
which reduced to 0.17 in the next tier.
The PBDE case study dealt with a complex situation comprising
seven components, each of which was itself a mixture of PBDE
congeners. A Tier 1 assessment produced MoEs of 300 (based on
upper-bound of a deterministic exposure estimate) or approxi-
mately 30 (based on biomonitoring) and, despite 30 being below
the critical value of 100 for MoEs, the authors considered that the
in-depth evaluation of human health risks from PBDEmixtures was
a ‘low priority’ (Meek et al., 2011). Further reﬁnement in higher
tiers and the need for risk management was not explored. Both
studies showed the need for further case studies to explore the
possible outcomes for scenarios that are different to those reported
so far; and in this paper we provide a scenario involvingmanymore
chemicals (67) than have been previously considered.
Here, we present a case study based on a dataset compiled
from evaluations of 67 pesticides by the Joint FAO/WHO Meeting
on Pesticide Residues (JMPR) between 2006 and 2010. We use this
case study to explore the options for reﬁnement within the hazard
portion of a tiered MRA approach following the conceptual
approach of the WHO/IPCS Framework (Meek et al., 2011). Our
aim was to use a relatively large, regulatory data set to explore
how reﬁnement options affect the outcome of MRA where
differing amounts of data are available. We have utilized the in-
ternational estimated daily intake (IEDI) values calculated for 67
pesticides in annual JMPR reports from 2006 to 2010 and use this
dataset to work through the tiers of the proposed Framework. The
case study does not represent an actual MRA for pesticides, rather
it is used to understand and explore the tiered approach and to
explore the consequences of differing data requirements and as-
sumptions for MRA.2. Materials and methods
The guiding approach used in this case study is the Hazard Index
(HI), which is calculated using the formula:
HI ¼
Xn
i¼1
ELi
ALi
where EL is the exposure level, AL is the acceptable level, and n is
the number of chemicals in the mixture. A hazard quotient (HQ) is
calculated for each chemical, by dividing EL by AL, and the HQs are
summed to give the HI. Various measures for exposure levels and
acceptable levels may be applied; the only constraint is that both
must be expressed in the same unit. Input values for AL can be, for
example, Acceptable Daily Intake (ADI) values or Reference Doses
(RfD) for speciﬁc endpoints. Where mean values are given, the or-
dinary arithmetic mean was used.
The dataset used in this case study was compiled from exposure
and risk data provided for 67 pesticides that were evaluated in the
ﬁve annual Joint FAO/WHO Meeting on Pesticide Residues (JMPR)
reports from 2006 to 2010 (JMPR, 2010; JMPR, 2009; JMPR, 2008;
JMPR, 2007; JMPR, 2006). 76 evaluations were included, with 9
pesticides being evaluated twice. JMPR reports establish acceptable
daily intakes (ADIs) and also report international estimated daily
intakes (IEDIs) which are calculated on a weight per person basis
Fig. 1. HI values for thirteen GEMS diet regions in Tier 1 MRA. A) bar chart showing
HI values for thirteen GEMS diet regions, thin horizontal red line indicates the critical
value of 1, thick horizontal red line indicates a HI of 10. B) bar chart showing each HI
value segmented into HQ values; HQ values are sorted within each bar using the
decreasing order of magnitude for region A so that coloured segments in different bars
represent the same chemical. HQ values for particular chemicals can be distinguished
in Fig. 2 and Table SI2. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure
legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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Food contamination and assessment programme (GEMS/Food,
http://www.who.int/foodsafety/areas_work/chemical-risks/gems-
food/en/). Cluster diets represent sets of countries grouped
together on the basis of food consumption patterns. The 178
countries making up each cluster diet are listed in Table SI1. IEDIs
are derived by multiplying the concentrations of residues (super-
vised trials median residues (STMRs), supervised trials median
residue in processed commodity (STMR-Ps) or recommended
MRLs) by the average daily per caput consumption estimated for
each commodity on the basis of the GEMS/Food diet. Prior to 2006,
the GEMS cluster diets were organised into 5 regions rather than
13, and hence data prior to 2006 is not readily compatible with data
from 2006 onwards and was not included.
When IEDI values are expressed as percentages of the ADI (as in
Annex 3 of each JMPR report), they are equivalent to the hazard
quotients (HQ) required for the calculation of a hazard index (HI).
The compiled data is presented in Table SI2 and has been scaled so
that the HQ and HI are on a unitary scale instead of percentage; on
the unitary scale, values greater than 1 indicate a greater than
acceptable risk for the single chemical (for HQ values) or mixture
(for HI values). HQ values are given to 3 decimal places, so that
values less than 0.001 are considered effectively zero. ADIs, and the
toxicological data used in their derivation, were collated from in-
dividual toxicological evaluations provided by JMPR for each of the
pesticides (Table SI3). Three of the evaluations referred to more
than one chemical by including an isomer or related structure. We
have referred to these as if they are single chemicals throughout the
case study, as follows (text used by JMPR given in brackets):
Cyﬂuthrin (‘CYFLUTHRIN with BETA-CYFLUTHRIN’), Cyhalothrin
(‘CYHALOTHRIN (including Lambdacyhalothrin)’), Triadimefon
(‘TRIADIMEFON with TRIADIMENOL’). The JMPR used two region-
speciﬁc bodyweights of 60 Kg (regions A to F, H to K and M) and
55 Kg (regions G and L); and these region-speciﬁc body weights
were used for calculations throughout this case study.
Chemical structures for each pesticide were retrieved from the
PPDB (Pesticide Properties DataBase, http://sitem.herts.ac.uk/aeru/
footprint/index2.htm) as Simpliﬁed Molecular Input Line Entry
Speciﬁcation (SMILES) codes and ToxTree software (version 2.5)
was used to assign chemicals to the appropriate Cramer class based
on their SMILES code. All of the chemicals weremembers of Cramer
class III, which receives a Threshold of Toxicological Concern (TTC)
value of 90 mg/person per day (all regions except G and L where TTC
of 82.5 mg/person is used due to an assumed average bodyweight of
55 kg instead of 60 kg). The PPDB was also used as the source for
health effect proﬁles for each pesticide.
3. Results
The full dataset used in this case study is provided in Table SI2,
which lists the 67 pesticides and 13 geographical regions included
in the study, and presents HQ and HI calculations. It is notable that
the HQ of an individual chemical exceeded 1 in only two instances,
both for chlorpyrifos-methyl, in regions C and H in 2009 (JMPR,
2009). In nine instances the same pesticide was evaluated twice
within the 2006e2010 period, and in all cases the second evalua-
tion resulted in a higher IEDI than the previous evaluation
(Figure SI1). The increase ranged from 11% (Difenoconazole, 2007/
2010) to 404% (Buprofezin, 2008/2009).
3.1. Tier 1: hazard index (HI) using ADI values
The results of a hazard index (HI) analysis are presented in Fig. 1
and Table SI2. The table shows HQs for 67 chemicals for 13 GEMS
diet regions. The HI (sum of all HQs) was greater than one for allregions, and exceeded 10 in one region (Fig. 1, Table SI2). HIs ranged
from 2.8 (Region J, Africa) to 11 (Region B, Africa/Europe/Middle
East). In no case was the HI solely driven by a single chemical
exceeding a HQ of 1; even in two instances when a single HQ
exceeded 1, removal of these values would not have reduced the HI
to less than one.
Individual values for each GEMS diet region are presented in
Fig. 1A and in Table SI2 (ﬁnal row). In all regions, the HI exceeded
the critical value of one, indicating that an acceptable level of risk
cannot be concluded and that reﬁnement of the assessment is
required. In one case, the HI was larger than 10 (region B), indi-
cating a calculated risk that is more than ten times greater than the
critical value (of one). At this tier, the calculation of HI values
greater than one means that a conclusion that risk is acceptable
cannot be reached, and indicates the need for further reﬁnement by
moving to a more data intensive analysis.
The way in which HQ values for each chemical contribute to the
overall HI value is shown graphically in Figs. 1B and 2. HQ values
ranged from a maximum of 1.4 down to effectively zero (Table SI2).
Fig. 2 shows that the HQ distribution is clearly skewed for all re-
gions, indicating that not all chemicals contribute equally to the HI.
In Fig. 1B the HI value for each region is broken down into striped
segments representing the individual HQ values that cumulate to
the HI value and this reveals that HQ values for particular chemicals
varied between the different regions. For example the red segment
closest to the x-axis in each bar (Fig. 1B) indicates the HQ of feni-
trothion which had the highest HQ in region A but made a pro-
portionately smaller contributions in regions such as C, G and I.
Fig. 2 shows cumulative distributions of HQ values for each region,
Fig. 2. HQ cumulative distributions in Tier 1. Graphs show a cumulative distribution of HQ values sorted in decreasing order of magnitude for each GEMS/Food region, indicated
by the panel letters A-M. Pesticide names are given along the x-axis but are more easily read by zooming in on the online ﬁgures or from the tables provided (Table SI2). For ease of
viewing, each graph is replicated at one graph per page as Figure SI2. Due to space constraints, only the ﬁrst 8 characters of each name is given in these ﬁgure. Horizontal lines
indicate the critical value of one (red line) and the HI (purple line). The interpretation of these values is described in more detail in the text. The HI value is shown on each graph
(purple text); as is the number of chemicals (n) that, when ranked by decreasing contribution to the HI, cause the HI to exceed one (blue lines and text); and the number (n) and
percentage of the chemicals that drive 80% of the HI (green lines and text). (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web
version of this article.)
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Fig. 3. Comparison of ADI, exposure and Tier 1 HQ distributions for region A. Bar
charts showing: A) Cumulative distribution of HQ values (IEDI/ADI expressed in
common units); B) HQ values; C) international estimated daily intakes (IEDI, mg/
person); D) ADI (JMPR, mg/kg bw). Data in A-C is for GEMS region A. Bars are sorted in
decreasing size of HQ (panel B).
Fig. 4. Comparison of HI with other summary metrics. Bar charts show different
metrics that express particular aspects of the mixture assessment for each GEMS
cluster diet and compares each metric to the HI. Metrics shown are A: HI, shown for
reference; B: the largest HQ in each diet (“Max. HQ”); C: the number of chemicals that
would cause the HI to equal or exceed one, when the actual HQs observed are ranked
in descending order (“NHI-1(ranked HQs)”); D: the mean HQ (ordinary arithmetic
mean); E: the number of chemicals that would cause the HI to equal or exceed one,
assuming each chemical has the mean HQ (“NHI-1(mean HQ)”). Horizontal red lines
indicates the critical value of 1 (thin line, A, B), 10 (thick line, A) and 1 divided by the
total number of chemicals, i.e. 1/67 (D). Scatter plots on the right of bar charts BeE
show the correlation of the metric shown in the bar chart (y-axis) with the HI (x-axis).
(For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is
referred to the web version of this article.)
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Fig. 2 shows that in two regions (C, H) the HI exceeded one when
there was only a single chemical contributing, whilst region G
showed the most gradual ‘ramp’ of the distribution, in that 4
chemicals are included before the cumulative HQ sum exceeds one.
Fig. 2 also provides an indicator of how many chemicals are
responsible for the bulk (set at 80%) of the HI, which ranged from 9
(13% of the 67 chemicals included) to 18 (27%). To allow easier
comparison of the HQ distributions, all thirteen distributions were
sorted (in decreasing order of HQmagnitude), normalized to the HI
for each region and superimposed in one ﬁgure (Figure SI3). This
graph reinforces the observation that the bulk of these HI values
(80%, dotted horizontal line in Figure SI3) is derived from a sizeable
minority of chemicals (9e18 chemicals, 13e27%), when the con-
tributions are sorted in decreasing magnitude.Each HQ value derives from two factors: an acceptable level
(which was the ADI in this case study) and an exposure level (IEDI).
Therefore we examined whether either factor drives the HI more
than the other. Fig. 3 shows the distribution of HQ values for region
A (as an example) and the underlying exposure level (IEDI) and
acceptable level (ADI) for the set of pesticides in this case study. All
distributions are plotted in order of descending HQ value, and the
ﬁgure shows that neither exposure levels nor acceptable levels
mirrored the resulting HQ distribution, indicating that the HQ
distribution is generally driven by a combination of the underlying
ADI and exposure distributions, and not directly by either one.
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The most information rich way of presenting the HI result in an
MRA is as a graph of the cumulative distribution of HQ values (e.g.
Fig. 2), however simple ways to describe or summarise the mixture
risk, for example as a single number, may be useful when there is a
need to compare many assessments, when viewing and comparing
many detailed graphs is impractical. Fig. 4 shows several other
metrics that can be readily derived from HIs: the largest HQ per
cluster diet (Fig. 4B); the number of chemicals whose HQs, when
ranked in descending order, add up to the portion of the HI that is
above 1 (“NHI-1(ranked HQs)”, Fig. 4C), i.e. if these HQs could be
reﬁned or managed such that they become zero then the remaining
chemicals would have a HI below 1; the average HQ (ordinary
arithmetic mean, Fig. 4D); and the number (N) of chemicals that
will cause the HI to exceed 1 if the average HQ is used (“NHI-1(mean
HQ)”, Fig. 4E). No single metric is fully descriptive by itself,
depending on the need to know about the size of the overall risk
estimate, the largest single driver of the effect or the extent to
which the risk estimate is driven by multiple chemicals (i.e.
whether the overall risk does indeed come from a ‘mixture’). Fig. 4
shows that most of the metrics do not correlate exactly with the HI,
indicating that they indeed provide another dimension to that
provided in the HI (which chieﬂy indicates the magnitude of the
overall predicted risk without providing any indication of the un-
derlying distributions of values).
Fig. 4B shows that the largest HQ in any diet was 1.4, for
Chlorpyrifos-methyl in region H (Latin America). Chlorpyrifos-
methyl also contributed the highest HQ in region C (Africa/Middle
East; 1.1) and region I (Africa; 0.93). The next highest HQs
approached, but did not exceed, 1 and were due to dimethoate in
region B (Africa/Europe/Middle East; 0.952) and region M (Europe/
Latin America; 0.897). This metric indicates which chemical is most
responsible for the size of the HI; however it does not indicate that
all the mixture ‘risk’ that is present comes from that one chemical.
In this study even if the largest HQ in each diet could be completely
removed, none of the HI values would fall below 1.
Fig. 4C shows NHI-1(ranked HQs), the number of chemicals that
constitute the portion of the HI that is above 1; this metric is also
shown on each graph in Fig. 2 (blue lines). NHI-1(ranked HQs)
ranged from 6 (diets A and J) to 28 (diet B), and shows that, in the
best case, if the chemicals leading to the six largest HQs could be
eliminated then the remaining 61 chemicals would have an HI of
just below 1, which could be deemed acceptable. In the worst case,
28 chemicals would need to be eliminated.
Fig. 4D shows a graph of average HQs, which exactly mirrors the
HI graph (Fig. 4A) because the same number of chemicals was
included for each cluster diet. However the critical value, indicated
by a red line at 1/67 (that is, the critical value for a HI, divided by the
number of chemicals included), shows that - in all of the cluster
diets - the size of the HQ for the average chemical will cause the HI
to exceed one, which is indeed what is seen for the HI (Figs. 1A and
4A). Fig. 4E shows that when the mean HQ is used to calculate the
metric NHI-1(mean HQ), values ranged from 42 for diet J (Africa) up
to 60 for diet B (Africa). This metric can be compared to NHI-
1(ranked HQs), shown in Fig. 4C, which is a similar calculation but
uses the observed HQs ranked in descending order rather than the
mean HQ. For example, for diet A, NHI-1(ranked HQs) was 6
chemicals but NHI-1(mean HQ) was 48 chemicals, 8-fold more. The
difference was not as large in other regions, for example in region B
NHI-1(ranked HQs) was 28 chemicals and NHI-1 (mean HQs) was 60
chemicals, 2.1-fold more. NHI-1(mean HQ) was always larger than
NHI-1(ranked HQs), because the HQ distributions are clearly skewed
(e.g. see Fig. 2), and in such situations averages are not accurate
representations of the actual distributions. This observation in-
dicates that a low tier analysis will be insightful for any mixturescenario in which the HQ distribution is skewed, and could be
useful for assessing the extent of anymixture problem. It then gives
an indication of the effects likely to be required i.e. the resources
available for reﬁnement or risk management can be focused on the
subset of chemicals which make a disproportionately large
contribution to the HI.
3.2. Tier 0: HI analysis using TTC values (pseudo-tier 0)
In this case study, a Tier 1 analysis based on ADIs was possible
because all of the included chemicals have been assigned ADIs.
However in some scenarios it is likely that MRAwill need to include
one or more chemicals that have not yet been assigned an ADI, and
the TTC has been proposed for use in such cases. We used our case
study, in which all ADI were known, to explore likely outcomes for
scenarios when one or more ADI are lacking. If a chemical has not
been assigned an ADI it has been suggested that the TTC approach
could be used in a tier ‘zero’ MRA, for example as explored by Price
et al. (2009). We have therefore applied the TTC approach to the
data set used in this case study to explore its impact. We note that
the TTC concept is not intended for use when chemicals have been
assigned ADIs, as was the case here, however we are using the
approach here to assess its impact rather than to perform a risk
assessment. We have also tested the extreme case when TTC values
are used for all of the chemicals in the assessment.
An HI assessment using TTC values, HI (TTC), is presented in
Figure SI5 which compares the HQ and HI values calculated using
ADIs (Tier 1) or TTC values (pseudo-Tier 0). HI (TTC) values ranged
from 37.5 to 146 and were up to 16 times greater than HI (ADI)s for
the same regions (Figure SI5). For example the HI (ADI) for region A
was 3.36 whilst the HI (TTC) for the same region was 37.6
(Figure SI5). The TTC might typically be applied to only a few
components in a mixture assessment, and the impact of the use of
TTC values should be assessed whenever they are used because risk
estimates driven by the use of TTC values are clear candidates for
reﬁnement before risk management action is taken. In this case
study, the mean HQ (TTC) value within each GEMS diet region
ranged from 0.6 to 2.2, and the mean over all GEMS regions was 1.1,
indicating that if a TTC valuewas applied to a single chemical, while
the remainder are assessed using their ADIs, then on average the HI
would be expected to exceed one in all cases. HQ (TTC) values
actually ranged from 0.001 to 16 and the impact of smaller values
would not greatly affect an overall HI, whilst larger values could be
fully responsible for a risk estimate exceeding 1. The distribution of
these values would only apply generally if other chemicals follow
similar risk and exposure distributions to the pesticides used in this
case study.
3.3. Higher tier analyses
Given that HI values calculated in Tier 1 exceed one, we
attempted to conduct a higher tier assessment. We compiled the
information used in the individual risk assessment of each pesticide
by JMPR. Table SI3 lists the NOAEL value for each chemical and
supporting information, including safety factor values. The most
common safety factor (SF) was 100 (applied to 59 out of 67
chemicals, 88%). The data in Table SI3 shows that the NOAEL for
each chemical was derived from a different endpoint, as identiﬁed
by JMPR. In consequence, higher tier MRA requires knowledge of
the highest dose tested that is without observable effect for all 67
endpoints and for each chemical. The reason for this high data
requirement is that, although the ADI for each chemical was set on
the basis of a different primary effect, all 67 chemicals could, in
theory, cause a common additional effect, at doses only slightly
above the NOAEL used in ADI setting, and this effect could cumulate
R.M. Evans et al. / Food and Chemical Toxicology 84 (2015) 260e269266and would have a risk only slightly lower than that of the HI
calculated from ADIs. In fact, this tier would require information for
all of the included chemicals on all of the endpoints thatmight be of
concern, not limited to endpoints onwhich any ADI was based. This
is a substantial data requirement, both in the experimental work
required and the effort involved in compilation of the data. It was
not feasible to attempt this data collection for this case study, since
the data, if available, are contained in dossiers in free text or in
tables, released only in reports with an often inconsistent structure,
and published in pdf format. None of these features facilitate data
extraction and compilation.
Since collection of the data required to perform a higher tier was
not feasible, this MRA would have to cease at this stage, with low
tiers having failed to conclude an acceptable risk, because HI values
exceeded one, and with this tier being unable to complete due to
data requirements. The data requirement of this stage is sufﬁciently
high that many assessments would not be completed at this stage,
however this does not affect MRAs in which it is possible to
conclude acceptable risk in low tiers, as there is no need to proceed
to higher tiers in such cases. In the next section, we illustrate a
possible reﬁnement step using a surrogate dataset in place of the
full set of toxicological information.
3.4. Tier 2: reﬁnement of HI values using effect data
In order to illustrate how anMRAmight progress in higher tiers,
we used a surrogate dataset of human health classiﬁcations from
the Pesticide Properties database (PPDB) for each of the 67 pesti-
cides. The PPDB includes nine human health issues, which are listed
in Table SI4 and shown in Fig. 5. The PPDB health issues are not
regulatory categories and may not be suitable for regulatory pur-
pose but they are used here to illustrate the approach. In addition,Fig. 5. Data conﬁdence distributions for nine health effects as assigned in PPDB.
Pie-charts showing the data conﬁdence assigned by PPDB to the pesticides included in
this case study for each of nine health issues (PPDB). Data conﬁdence was assigned for
each pesticide as ‘yes’: known to cause a problem; ‘no’: known not to cause a problem;
‘?’: possibly, status not identiﬁed; or ‘nd’: no data.some of the effects are acute, for which comparison to the IEDI (a
chronic measure) could result in an underestimation of risk. For the
purpose of this case study it is assumed that the PPDB health issues
cover all of the effects of interest, and that they are assigned reli-
ably. The PPDB assigns one of four classiﬁcations for each chemical
for each health issue as follows: known to cause an effect; known
not to cause the effect; data unclear; or data unavailable. The
classiﬁcations from PPDB for all 67 pesticides included in this case
study are shown in Fig. 5 and reﬁned HI values are shown in Fig. 6.
Note that, at this tier, there is now a HI value for each included
endpoint (Fig. 6).
Using the PPDB classiﬁcation it is possible to exclude the HQ of a
chemical from the HI calculation if the chemical is known not to
cause the effect under consideration (green segments, Figure SI7). It
would not be sufﬁciently conservative to only include the chemicals
that are known to cause an effect, since in many cases there are
numerous chemicals for which the data are classiﬁed as unclear or
unavailable. Consequently all three situations (known, unclear and
data unavailable) are included in Fig. 6 but their relative contri-
butions are shown as coloured segments of the bar representing
each HI so that it can be seen how much of the revised HI is due to
risks that are known or to risks arising from conservative as-
sumptions (i.e. assuming a contribution to the joint effect unless
proven otherwise). If quantitative data is available for each
endpoint, for example a PoD, then a reﬁned HI can be calculated
using reference values for each endpoint, rather than repeatedly
using the value for the most sensitive endpoint (as is implied by
using the ADI). However, calculating reﬁned HIs was not possible in
this example.
In general, this approach would reduce risk estimates when
chemicals can reasonably be excluded from consideration, for
example, when they are known not to cause a given effect. In this
case study, if only the ‘known’ risks are considered (red portions,
Fig. 6) some of the health effects show a HI below one. However
when the risks for chemicals that have unclear or unavailable data
(blue and grey portions, Fig. 6) are also included, none of the HI
assessments are below one. Thus, in this case study, it was not
possible to draw a conclusion of acceptable risk at any of the tiers
considered.
4. Discussion
A tiered MRA approach was used for 67 pesticides across thir-
teen GEMS diet regions, and produced low tier HI values that
exceeded one in all regions, meaning that acceptable risk could not
be concluded at this tier. Further reﬁnement, for example by
grouping according to common health effects was not possible due
to high data requirements, however the approach that could be
used was illustrated using PPDB health issue classiﬁcations. In one
region, the HI value was greater than 10, demonstrating the need
for guidance on interpreting the magnitude of the HI. When the HI
exceeds one in low tiers, visualizing the HQ distribution may be
helpful in showing which chemicals have a signiﬁcant impact on
the MRA e these are optimal candidates for reﬁnement of either
the exposure or hazard assessment in a higher tier. If many
chemicals have a signiﬁcant impact, then this provides an indica-
tion that the resources required to reﬁne, and presumably reduce,
risk estimates in higher tiers may be substantial. Conversely, re-
sources do not need to be expended on reﬁning either risk or
hazard data for chemicals that do not contribute signiﬁcantly.
In this study, the HQ of an individual chemical exceeded one on
two occasions; both for chlorpyrifos-methyl in 2009, in regions C
and H (JMPR, 2009). The JMPR has stated that “Percentages above
100 [equivalent to a HQ above 1] should not necessarily be inter-
preted as giving rise to a health concern because of the conservative
Fig. 6. HI values adjusted in Tier 2 MRA using PPDB classiﬁcations. Bar charts showing the HI for each health effect and each GEMS region (indicated by letters A-M) segmented
by the data conﬁdence assigned to each health issue and for each chemical. The graphic at bottom right provides a visual guide to interpretation of the graphs. Colours as in Fig. 5.
Health issues are abbreviated as C, carcinogen; M, mutagen; ED, endocrine disrupter; R, reproduction/developmental effect; AI, acetylcholinesterase inhibitor; N, neurotoxicant; RSP,
respiratory tract irritant; SK, skin irritant; EY, eye irritant. Horizontal blue lines indicate the HI (ADI) value calculated in Tier 1. Horizontal red lines indicate the critical value of one.
(For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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note that the assumptions being used have been criticized and may
be inappropriate for MRA, not least because they were not devel-
oped for this purpose (Martin et al., 2013). When a single HQ ex-
ceeds one then the HI will necessarily exceed one, but the scenario
should still be examined because other components may none-
theless contribute signiﬁcantly to themixture risk. In any case there
is clearly a need for robust guidance on the appropriate level of
‘trigger’ values for HQ and HI and on decision criteria for action
accompanying such triggers, for example the resort to risk man-
agement when further reﬁnement has not been possible.
The HI is a composite of hazard and exposure data for the
included chemicals, however the overall driver of the HI value
would appear to be the number of chemicals included. Opinions
vary as to what this number would be in a realistic human sce-
nario, and this constitutes an important knowledge gap. For
example, in this case study if the average HQ is assumed, the HI
would equal or exceed one if the number of ‘average’ chemicals
was more than 6 (region B) or 24 (region J), in the best and worst
case, respectively. It might be unlikely that all 67 of the chemicals
in this case study, or even 24 of them, would share a common
effect but it does not seem implausible that 6 or 7 chemicals might
have a common effect, and this would be enough to generate a
HI > 1 given the exposure pattern of for example, in this case
study, region B.
In a tiered assessment, there are 3 outcomes at each tier: 1) risk
is acceptable ¼MRA stops; 2) risk is not acceptable, reﬁnement is
possible ¼ proceed to next tier; 3) risk is not acceptable, reﬁne-
ment is not possible ¼ MRA stalls. Risk management should be
considered either when higher tiers are not available or when
MRA stalls, and there is a need to consider whether the high data
demands of higher tiers make this likely to happen frequently,
particularly when many chemicals are present in the MRA. The
availability of a precautionary, low tier is valuable in allowing low
risk scenarios to be rapidly identiﬁed without the expenditure of
signiﬁcant resource.
The issue of data availability and accessibility also applies to the
use of mode or mechanism of action information. As well as there
being no agreed framework to structure these discussions, the data
that would be required to consider mode/mechanism is typically
not available, is not a regulatory requirement, and would require
signiﬁcant resources to generate (Carmichael et al., 2011). As a
result we have proposed that such considerations should not be
included in the low tiers of MRA frameworks, as there would be a
strong likelihood of the data requirement not being met, causing
the MRA to stall; instead we proposed grouping only on the basis of
common toxicological effect (Kortenkamp et al., 2012). In this way,
completion of the MRA at lower tiers with relatively low data de-
mands has the ability to avoid the need for detailed analyses in
higher tiers if the conservative, somewhat worse-case, approaches
used in low tiers already indicate low risk. The proposed approach
rewards data rich situations by allowing assessments to be reﬁned
in higher tiers when accurate, derived values can be used in place of
default, sometime worse-case, assumptions. Higher (more reﬁned)
tiers should be deﬁned so that they cannot produce a higher esti-
mate of risk (as this would indicate that the lower tiers were not
precautionary enough) and will usually, but not always, result in a
lower estimate of risk.
Although the purpose of this case study was not to perform an
actual MRA for human pesticide exposure, we brieﬂy consider
whether these results are relevant to human health risks from
pesticides. Due to the low tier nature of the calculations, and
because our theoretical implementation of an MRA strategy failed
before higher tiers were reached, we can only conclude that our
analysis does not indicate any risk but also provides no evidence forthe absence of risk. Our assessment includes many uncertainties,
such as: IEDI values were cumulated without knowledge of the
correlations between exposures to different pesticides; simulta-
neous exposure to all 67 pesticides was assumed; GEMS diets are
set for a wide geographical area and there may be signiﬁcant
regional variation within each diet, which we could not consider;
low tier HI calculation assumes a worst case that the ADI values are
for a common endpoint shared by all the components and this
could be shown to not be the case in this study (Table SI3); only 67
pesticides were included, not all pesticides in current use, and non-
pesticides, such as dietary components, pollutants, additives and
pharmaceuticals were not included; only dietary exposure was
considered, not other routes.
This case study identiﬁes several generic issues affecting the
implementation of MRA: to reduce the impediments to perform-
ing MRA, toxicological data need to be accessible and collated
across endpoints and across chemicals. The data for hazard and
exposure should be in comparable metrics and available in an
open, standardised format, and data summarization and censoring
should be avoided. The need for consistency for the purposes of
mixture assessment may be in tension with the ﬂexibility that is
possible in the single chemical risk assessment process, and this
tension should be managed so that both single chemical and
mixture assessments are well served. In order to be useful for
mixture assessments, chemical testing should not be predicated
on the most sensitive endpoint because, although this is appro-
priate for single chemical assessment, it becomes an obstacle to
the assessment of multiple chemicals which do not have the most
sensitive effect in common. It follows, that an MRA will only be
able to consider those endpoints for which data are available for
most of the included chemicals. The generation of new data for a
particular endpoint may be so impractical as to be virtually
impossible if the separate testing of many chemicals would be
required. Finally, an MRA should start with a scoping step that
identiﬁes the chemicals to be included and the likely data avail-
ability so that achievable tiers can be constructed, as there is little
value in attempting tiers that cannot be completed due to data
requirements. Trigger values for HI and decision criteria for each
tier should be set at the scoping stage.
In conclusion, our case study shows that single chemical data
are not currently sufﬁcient for use in MRA; that the number of
chemicals likely to be present in a mixture scenario is a major
knowledge gap; and that there is a need for clear, science-based
guidance on decisions resulting from HI calculation at different
tiers, including the explicit need for risk management action if
either the highest tier is exceeded or if higher tiers are needed but
cannot be completed due to data gaps. Other major issues in the
regulatory implementation of MRA include the need for 1)
consideration of the human body as a single receiving point for
chemicals; 2) inclusion of all relevant chemicals and routes in MRA
without artiﬁcial restriction; and 3) better understanding of
whether the assumptions used in single chemical assessments are
suitable or protective when used in a mixture context.
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